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a b s t r a c t
Integral to strategic cost management is the choice of procuring ﬂexible versus committed resources conditioned on demand uncertainty. Prior research shows that costs respond less to decreases than increases in
sales activity when ﬁrms invest in committed resources. We analyze asymmetry in cost behavior to investigate how resource procurement decisions between ﬂexible and committed resources are related to precedent and antecedent information about demand uncertainty. We ﬁnd that the asymmetry of cost
responsiveness increases with historical sales growth and with the ﬁrm's market-to-book ratio, and decreases with historical sales volatility. We ﬁnd similar results for ﬁrm-speciﬁc deviations of sales growth,
sales volatility and the market-to-book ratio from the industry averages. These results illustrate how managers might combine precedent and antecedent information in formulating a resource procurement plan as
a means of strategic cost management.
© 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
Managing costs by utilizing resources effectively is regarded as fundamental to success in today's competitive environment (Finney,
Campbell, & Powell, 2005; Hooley, Greenley, Cadogan, & Fahy, 2005).
Due to advances in telecommunications and other information technology (IT), recent years have seen signiﬁcant expansion of ﬁrms' opportunities to employ ﬂexible resources rather than committed resources to
support ﬁrm activities. Services such as Amazon offer online retailers
the opportunity to outsource the entire direct-to-customer distribution
network. Efﬁciency gained from IT also permits outsourcing of dataintensive tasks for accounting and control, information management,
and customer support. In addition, companies may obtain ﬂexible
resources through traditional avenues, such as renting assets rather
than purchasing them or hiring temporary rather than permanent
employees.
Using ﬂexible resources enables agility in cost management, but
agility is not free. Due to risk transfer and market contracting, there
is a price premium for ﬂexible resources and ﬁrms that rely on ﬂexible resources face the risk of price changes. Agility achieved through
outsourcing also risks control loss and potential quality impairment
(Kaya & Özer, 2009; Ren & Zhang, 2009; Ren & Zhou, 2008). Moreover, the pursuit of ﬂexibility through outsourced contracts exposes
ﬁrms to political costs, particularly in large public ﬁrms (Dunn,
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Kohlbeck, & Magilke, 2009; McGee, 2005). Investing in committed resources develops in-house capability and control that may lead to
cost management advantages. On the other hand, investing in committed resources subjects the ﬁrm to costs of carrying underutilized
resources when activity demand is low because of resource scaling
and high transactions costs associated with acquiring or disposing
of committed resources.
Previous studies have evaluated cost management through resource
procurement, focusing on labor markets. These studies model managers'
resource procurement decisions with respect to uncertainty about
future demand (Pinker & Larson, 2003; Rebitzer & Taylor, 1991). Firms
optimize over a combination of permanent and contingent labor resources. Some researchers, for example Daniel, Lohrke, Fornaciari, and
Turner (2004), have highlighted the importance of additional research
into management of excess resources to enhance performance. We
broaden the focus to examine resources other than labor by looking at
the variety of resources represented by selling, general and administrative (SG&A) costs. The extension of contingent contracting to resources
other than labor is natural. For example, a ﬁrm might negotiate a
long-term property lease with ﬁxed payments or a short-term lease
with payments equal to a percentage of sales. The ﬁrst contract ensures
long-term access to a resource at a known cost. The second provides
short-term access to a resource at a cost that varies with the actual
level of sales. Demand uncertainty should motivate a consistent managerial approach to procurement of all SG&A resources. Our objective is
to empirically examine the relationship between variables that could inform managers on the distribution of past and future demand and the
choice of commitment versus ﬂexibility as evident in asymmetric
SG&A cost behavior.

0148-2963/$ – see front matter © 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2012.08.021
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Selling, general and administrative (SG&A) costs make up a large
portion of ﬁrm expenses (Neelankavila & Alaganar, 2003) and represent a myriad of marketing and advertising, selling, distribution, management, and customer support activities. Resources used include
ofﬁce, selling and distribution facilities, management, selling and
support labor, and communication and information infrastructure.
Because of the diverse combination of resources required to support
SG&A activities and the less well-deﬁned relation between SG&A
costs and production, the costs of these activities can be more difﬁcult
to manage than costs generated in producing the goods or services
that the organization sells. The SG&A costs incurred for a period are
the product of multiple disparate contracts including rent and lease
agreements, temporary and permanent employment commitments,
purchase orders and contracts for external services. These costs are
not necessarily volume driven, but must be managed through a combination of contingent contracting for ﬂexible resources and investment in committed resources in order to support the potential and
realized level of sales activity. Our study focuses on the procurement
of ﬂexible versus committed resources to manage SG&A costs. Specifically, we are interested in empirically capturing variation in the mix
of ﬂexible versus committed SG&A resources with respect to precedent and antecedent information about demand uncertainty.
In contrast to the ﬁxed and variable cost model traditionally used
in managerial accounting, studies using the “sticky costs” model
(Anderson, Banker, & Janakiraman, 2003) recognize that managers
must intervene to adjust the resources that support an activity when
the activity demand increases or decreases. Asymmetric cost responsiveness or “cost stickiness” happens when managers decide to retain
resource slack created by a drop in activity demand. According to the
sticky costs model, managers who are optimistic about future sales
growth prospects are more likely to retain SG&A resources when the
adjustment costs are high relative to the costs of carrying slack resources. Anderson, Banker, Huang, and Janakiraman (2007) observe
that ﬁnancial analysts treat an increase in SG&A as bad news regardless
of the direction of the change in sales. They ﬁnd that an increase
in SG&A when revenue declines is on average good news that is
undervalued by the market. Banker, Byzalov, Ciftci, and Mashruwala
(2012) ﬁnd that the asymmetry in cost responsiveness reverses if revenue also declined in the preceding year.
Investment in committed resources exposes companies to the costs
of carrying underutilized resources when demand falls. Due to the
trade-off between the higher unit cost of using ﬂexible resources and
the potential cost burden of carrying underutilized committed resources, a mismatch between demand uncertainty and resource procurement exposes the company to greater operating risk. While the
sticky costs literature focuses on managers' ex post decisions to retain
or remove slack resources in response to a realized change in sales demand, we consider how managers' ex ante resource procurement decisions affect asymmetric cost responsiveness. So, rather than placing
emphasis on managers' expectations of growth prospects in relation
to a decline in sales, we look at how managers use their experience
and available information to plan and manage strategically for the future. Procurement focused on agility, favoring ﬂexible resources, leads
to less asymmetric cost responsiveness because the adjustment costs
are low relative to the costs of carrying slack resources. Following the
labor studies that model contingent contracting as a response to demand uncertainty, we link asymmetric cost responsiveness to precedent and antecedent variables that capture information about demand
growth and volatility for the ﬁrm and its industry.
We use two variables to capture information about demand growth:
historical sales growth and the market-to-book ratio of the ﬁrm. We use
historical sales volatility as a measure of demand volatility. We expect
the precedent variables, historical sales growth and sales volatility, to
be important for their information value and because they represent
the demand environment under which the decision-making and control systems of the ﬁrm evolved. We expect the antecedent variable,

the market-to-book ratio to be informative for the procurement choice
because it is a common indicator of future growth expectations and a
management performance benchmark. If resource procurement does
correspond to demand uncertainty, then a persistent-growth ﬁrm
should adopt control mechanisms that favor committed resources. A
high-volatility ﬁrm should select mechanisms favoring ﬂexible resources. Our ﬁrst set of tests examines the link between resource
procurement and demand uncertainty by relating asymmetric cost responsiveness of SG&A costs to these precedent and antecedent variables
for a broad cross-section of ﬁrms.
Our second set of tests controls for industry effects. These tests are
compelling for a number of reasons. First, ﬁrms within an industry
have similar resource needs. Second, companies within an industry
face similar demand uncertainty. Third, competition within an industry pushes companies to adopt similar cost management practices.
Thus, we expect that companies within an industry will generally
have similar demand characteristics and resource procurement proﬁles. However, companies may differ from their peers because they
adopt production or marketing models that lead to either greater
sales volatility or more persistent growth. The resulting demand differences may in turn lead to SG&A resource procurement decisions
that are tilted more toward either cost agility or resource-based
capability.
For our empirical analysis, we estimate an empirical model that relates the change in SG&A costs between two adjacent periods to the
change in sales between the same periods. The model includes an indicator variable to distinguish between sales increases and sales decreases. Previous studies that use this model have found that SG&A
costs go down less with sales decreases than they go up with sales increases (Anderson et al., 2003; Subramaniam & Weidenmier, 2003).
They attribute this asymmetric cost responsiveness to high adjustment
costs relative to carrying costs for slack resources. We consider strategic
aspects of managerial decision making about the procurement of SG&A
resources (see discussion in DeRijcke, Faes, & Vollering, 1985) by observing that a resource procurement plan that favors ﬂexible resources
would lead to lower adjustment costs relative to carrying costs and a
plan that favors committed resources would lead to higher adjustment
costs relative to carrying costs. Therefore, greater asymmetric cost responsiveness would be associated with resource procurement that emphasizes committed resources.
We ﬁnd that asymmetric cost responsiveness increases with the
historical sales growth of the ﬁrm and decreases with the historical
sales volatility of the ﬁrm. These results support the argument that
managers' resource procurement plans are developed over time in
alignment with demand uncertainty experience and that cost management practices tend to become institutionalized. We ﬁnd that
the degree of cost asymmetry increases with the market-to-book
ratio. This supports the hypothesis that ﬁrms develop in-house capability by investing in committed resources when the prospects for demand growth are higher. When we control for industry average levels
of sales growth, sales volatility and the book-to-market ratio, we ﬁnd
that asymmetric cost responsiveness increases with the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
deviations from the industry mean of sales growth and the marketto-book ratio and decreases with the ﬁrm-speciﬁc deviation from
the industry mean of sales volatility. This indicates development of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc resource procurement plans that coincide with ﬁrmspeciﬁc demand uncertainty relative to industry peers.
Our results contribute to the study of strategic cost management
through resource procurement choices under demand uncertainty
by providing empirical evidence connecting asymmetry in cost behavior to precedent and antecedent information about sales growth
and volatility. We also add to the analysis of strategic cost management within industries by linking asymmetry in SG&A cost behavior
to ﬁrm-speciﬁc measures of demand uncertainty. In the next section
we discuss our hypotheses. Section 3 describes our empirical tests,
analysis, and results. Section 4 concludes the paper.
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2. Information, resource procurement, and cost behavior
A resource procurement plan affects operating risk because of the
potential mismatch between demand uncertainty and cost behavior.
A manager hiring full-time employees rather than part-time employees, or entering into a long-term lease rather than an annual
lease, has purchased reliable long-term access to a resource. However, if demand declines, such commitment could impede the ﬁrm's
proﬁtability. A manager with high growth expectations would want
to invest in the committed resource in order to realize the beneﬁts
from the acquired capability, but a manager facing more up and
down variability in demand would prefer the ﬂexible resource. We
observe that whether a ﬁrm has a ﬂexible procurement proﬁle or a
proﬁle typiﬁed by long-term commitments would manifest itself in
measurable cross-sectional differences in the behavior of SG&A costs.
We distinguish between ﬂexible and committed resources in terms
of granularity, carrying or usage costs, and adjustment costs. By granularity, we mean the lot size for acquiring resources in terms of units of
capacity for that resource. By carrying or usage costs, we mean the
costs of sustaining or using a lot size of resource capacity once that capacity has been acquired. By adjustment costs, we mean the costs of acquiring or disposing of a lot size of resource capacity. Carrying or usage
costs and adjustment costs of resources include both pecuniary costs
and non-pecuniary costs such as a loss of control when resources are
sourced externally. This description of costs is consistent with active
management of costs that is described in the sticky costs model.
Contracts for ﬂexible resources are more granular than contracts for
committed resources and may be contingent on the demand for the resources based on the level of sales activity. Carrying or usage costs per
unit of capacity for ﬂexible resources are typically higher than carrying
or usage costs per unit of capacity for committed resources but adjustment costs for adding or removing ﬂexible resources are normally
lower than adjustment costs for committed resources. For example, a
company may contract externally for information technology (IT) support or it may develop the capability internally. The ﬂexible IT resource
may be acquired in lot sizes of 1 h of support time as needed. The adjustment costs of obtaining the ﬂexible resource externally would include basic contracting costs and the carrying or usage costs of the
ﬂexible resource would equal the cost per hour of support acquired during a period. The committed IT resource may be acquired by hiring IT
support staff in lot sizes of 40 h per week. The adjustment costs of
obtaining the committed resource internally would include search
and training costs for employees and set-up costs for leased or purchased equipment. The carrying or usage costs of the internal resource
would include employee salary and lease or capital charges (depreciation and interest) for the equipment. The adjustment costs of reducing
the committed resource may include severance pay and the costs of disposing of equipment through lease termination or sale. Other examples
of using ﬂexible versus committed resources include hiring temporary
employees versus permanent employees, entering short-term rental
agreements for facilities and equipment versus long-term leases or purchases, contracting with consultants versus internal experts for various
services, outsourcing back-ofﬁce activities versus developing internal
support, using online sales services such as Amazon versus self-hosted
selling, and using external logistics providers such as UPS versus managing shipping internally.
The selection of a procurement plan focusing either on cost agility
or cost advantages from committed resources should reﬂect expectations for demand growth and risk. Our choice of conditioning variables focuses on information that would inﬂuence the formation of
management's expectations and the institutional arrangements
governing management's choice set. First, we expect the level of resource commitment to vary with the historical growth of the ﬁrm.
In addition to its potential predictive value, a ﬁrm's sales growth history reinforces a compatible set of corporate culture, systems, and
rules governing cost management. Persistent growth would reward
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managers' willingness to invest in capability, engendering systems,
rules, and relationships that support commitment rather than ﬂexibility. On the other hand, a ﬁrm that has experienced low growth or
decline would develop controls where long-term commitments are
highly scrutinized. This leads to our ﬁrst hypothesis stated as follows:
H1. Asymmetric cost responsiveness increases in the magnitude and
persistence of historical sales growth.
Resource commitments that lead to asymmetric cost responsiveness
are likely to be long-term commitments. Banker, Huang, and Natarajan
(2011) ﬁnd that incentive compensation is more long term when SG&A
resource expenditures create higher future value and that new equity
incentives lead to higher resource expenditure when such expenditure
creates more long-term value. Therefore, a manager making such commitments would develop long-term expectations of sales. Capital market valuation provides an indication of investors' growth expectations
and may be used to proxy for long-term sales growth expectations of
managers. The ratio of market to book value indicates investors' expectations of future abnormal earnings relative to assets in place. It reﬂects
both the magnitude and persistence of sales growth expectations. It is
salient to management's resource procurement plan because it captures
expectations over a long-term time horizon and portrays conﬁdence in
future growth. Committed resources accommodate sales growth because lower carrying or usage costs per unit of committed resources
make the cost of supporting increases in sales activity lower than if ﬂexible resources were used. Managers with higher sales growth expectations will bear the higher adjustment costs of investing in committed
resources in order to take advantage of the lower carrying or usage
costs. Because cost asymmetry is associated with a higher mix of committed to ﬂexible resources, we expect a positive relation between
asymmetric cost responsiveness and the market to book ratio. Hypothesis two captures this.
H2. The asymmetric cost responsiveness increases in the magnitude of
the market-to-book ratio.
Managers facing high sales volatility at the ﬁrm or industry level
would be less willing to commit to contracts that increase resource
capability because such contracts would create a mismatch between
demand ﬂuctuations and cost behavior, increasing operating risk. To
the extent that past volatility predicts future volatility, managers
would react to historically volatile sales by building ﬂexibility in the
SG&A components of the value chain. Moreover, a ﬁrm with historically volatile sales is likely to have controls in place that scrutinize
and discourage commitment. Higher sales volatility favors ﬂexible
resources relative to committed resources because the lower adjustment costs offset the higher carrying or usage costs of ﬂexible resources when sales levels are more volatile. We expect, therefore, to
ﬁnd a negative association between asymmetry cost responsiveness
and historical sales volatility as stated in our third hypothesis.
H3. The asymmetric cost responsiveness decreases with historical sales
volatility.
Our development of hypotheses H1, H2 and H3 is based on differences in demand uncertainty across a broad spectrum of ﬁrms. Strategy
is often considered from an industry perspective with companies developing ﬁrm-speciﬁc approaches for competing with rivals in their own
industries. Because ﬁrms within an industry have similar resource
needs and share common expectations about demand uncertainty,
competition drives them to similar approaches to cost management.
In fact, research indicates mean reversion in key performance indicators
for ﬁrms competing in an industry (Baber, Kim, & Kumar, 1999;
Fairﬁeld, Ramnath, & Yohn, 2009; Lev, 1969). However, a company
may face different demand uncertainty from its competition within an
industry. It may, for instance, sell innovative products whose sales are
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more volatile or it may focus on growth through expansion into new
markets. Under our hypotheses, a ﬁrm that experiences and anticipates
growth would invest in committed resources to take advantage of lower
unit costs and greater control. A ﬁrm that develops innovative products
with short product life cycles would favor ﬂexible resources that give it
cost agility. Hypothesis four, stated below, extends hypotheses one, two
and three by controlling for industry average effects.
H4. Controlling for industry average effects, asymmetric cost responsiveness increases with deviations from the industry mean for sales growth
and the market-to-book ratio, and decreases with deviation from the
mean for sales volatility.
In the next section we describe our empirical model, sample selection, and discuss the results of our analysis.
3. Data analysis and results

"

3.1. Sample

log

Our sample consists of 79,177 ﬁrm-year observations spanning
30 years, 1980 to 2009, from the COMPUSTAT database. We deleted
ﬁrm-years with missing sales revenue or SG&A costs and excluded
ﬁrm-years where SG&A costs were greater than sales revenue
(Anderson et al., 2003). For each ﬁrm-year t we required sales revenue to be available from t − 1 to t − 5 to calculate historical sales
growth and sales volatility. We also excluded ﬁrm years with missing
share price or number of shares, and missing or negative book value.
The time t historical sales growth (Historical Growthit) is the average annual sales growth between years t − 5 and t − 1. The time t
market-to-book ratio (MTBit) is market value divided by book value
of equity at the end of year t − 1. The time t historical sales volatility
(Volatilityit) is the standard deviation of sales revenue from t − 1 to
t − 5, with sales revenue scaled by total assets. We form an industry
average of each variable of interest for each two-digit SIC industry.
Firms within two-digit SIC codes containing fewer than four members
are classiﬁed as “Other.”
Descriptive information is provided in panel A of Table 1. The mean
(median) annual sales revenue is $2,385 million ($263 million). The
mean (median) annual SG&A costs is $4413 million ($503 million).
The mean (median) average sales growth over the past 5 years is
14.86% (10.81%). The mean (median) sales volatility is 0.20 (0.15).
The mean (median) market-to-book ratio is 2.24 (1.62).
3.2. Empirical model
Our basic empirical model is,
"
log

#
"
#
"
#
SGAi;t
Salesi;t
Salesi;t
¼ β 0 þ β1 log
þ β 2  Di;t  log
þ ε i;t ;
SGAi;t−1
Salesi;t−1
Salesi;t−1

#
"
#
"
#
SGAi;t
Salesi;t
Salesi;t
¼ β0 þ β1 log
þ β2  Di;t  log
SGAi;t−1
Salesi;t−1
Salesi;t−1
"
#
Salesi;t
þ β3  Growthi;t−1  Di;t  log
Salesi;t−1
"
#
Salesi;t
þ β4  Volatilityi;t−1  Di;t  log
þ εi;t
Salesi;t−1

Growthit is either average historical growth over the past 5 years
or the expected growth proxied by the market-to-book ratio. We estimate the model separately with historical or expected growth and
we estimate a version of the model that includes both growth variables. Under our model speciﬁcation, β3 or β4 would be negative if
the given variable increases the asymmetry in cost response and positive if the variable reduces the asymmetry in cost response. Based on
our hypotheses, we expect β3 to be negative and β4 to be positive.
We estimate our empirical model using ordinary least squares. We
adjust the standard errors for heteroskedasticity, serial, and crosssectional correlation using a two-way cluster at the ﬁrm and year
level suggested by Petersen (2009) as the preferred method for estimating standard errors using panel data. We winsorize any variable for
values in the highest or lowest 0.5% of the sample.
3.3. Results
Table 2 provides the results of estimating the basic model. The estimated coefﬁcients of β̂1 = 0.6445 (t = 110.24) and β̂2 = − 0.1893
(t = − 16.50) are similar to ﬁndings of prior studies (i.e. Anderson
et al., 2003; Subramaniam & Weidenmier, 2003), consistent with

Table 2
Asymmetric cost responsiveness

Table 1
Descriptive statistics.

"
log

Sample period 1980–2009
N
Sales revenue
(millions)
SG&A costs (millions)
Historical growth (%)
Volatility
MTB

where Di,t equals 1 if sales decreased between t − 1 and t, and zero
otherwise (Anderson et al., 2003). The dummy variable Di,t captures
the asymmetric responsiveness of SG&A costs to sales. The coefﬁcient
β1 represents the change in SG&A costs in relation to the change in
sales when sales increase between t − 1 and t. The sum of the coefﬁcients β1 + β2 represents the change in SG&A costs in relation to the
change in sales when sales decrease between t − 1 and t. If SG&A
costs do not fall as much when sales decrease as they rise when
sales increase by an equivalent amount, then the sum of β1 and β2
would be less than β1 alone. Therefore, assuming β1 > 0, asymmetric
cost responsiveness is represented by β2 b 0.
To test hypotheses H1, H2 and H3, we examine the effect of each
variable of interest on the asymmetric cost responsiveness by
expanding the basic model to include a term where the variable of
interest is allowed to interact with Di,t and the change in sales as
follows.

Mean

Standard
deviation

Median Lower
Upper
quartile quartile

79,177 2384.55 10,480.43 263.06

69.93

1064.60

79,177
79,177
79,177
79,177

14.53
3.68
0.07
1.04

191.65
20.46
0.26
2.60

440.83
14.86
0.20
2.24

1814.43
19.86
0.20
2.17

#
"
#
"
#
SGAi;t
Salesi;t
Salesi;t
¼ β 0 þ β 1 log
þ β 2  Di;t  log
þ εi;t ; :
SGAi;t−1
Salesi;t−1
Salesi;t−1

50.14
10.81
0.15
1.62

Historical growth: The average of four annual sales growth observations from t − 5 to
t − 4, t − 4 to t − 3, t − 3 to t − 2, and t − 2 to t − 1. Volatility: The standard deviation
of sales revenue (divided by total assets) for the years t − 5 to t − 1. MTB: Market
value at the end of year t − 1 divided by book value at end of year t − 1.

Intercept
Log(Salei,t/Salei, t−1)
Di,txLog(Salei,t/Salei, t−1)
R-Squared
N

Predicted
sign

Coefﬁcient
estimate

T-stat

+
−

0.0259⁎⁎⁎
0.6445⁎⁎⁎
−0.1893⁎⁎⁎

31.28
110.24
−16.50

0.4212
79,177

t‐Statistics are calculated after adjusting the standard errors for heteroskedasticity, serial,
and cross-sectional correlation using a two-way cluster at the ﬁrm and year level.
Di,t: Dummy variable equals to 1 if Sales declined from t − 1 to t, 0 otherwise.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
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asymmetric cost responsiveness for sales decreases compared to sales
increases.
We estimate the model with ﬁrm-level variables of interest to test
our hypotheses H1, H2 and H3. The results, described below, are
reported in Table 3. Column I reports the estimation results with the average historical sales growth and column II reports the estimation results with the market-to-book ratio as the Growthit variable. Column
III provides the estimation results with both growth variables included
in the model. The condition index numbers when both historical
growth and the market-to-book ratio are included is well below the
suggested benchmark of 30, indicating that multicollinearity is not a
concern in our estimations (Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 1980).
3.3.1. Hypothesis HI: Historical sales growth
Under hypothesis H1, asymmetric cost responsiveness would
increase with average historical sales growth implying that the coefﬁcient on the historical growth variable would be negative. The estimated coefﬁcient β̂3 for the historical sales growth term is − 0.3736
(t = − 12.18) in column I and − 0.3318 (t = − 10.55) in column III,
supporting hypothesis H1. The fact that growth history has an incremental effect to the market-to-book ratio in column III, and vice
versa, is interesting because it indicates distinctive properties for
each growth variable.
3.3.2. Hypothesis H2: Market-to-book ratio
The market-to-book ratio provides an indication of long-term sales
growth expectations. Accordingly, our prediction under hypothesis H2
is a negative coefﬁcient on the MTB variable. The estimated coefﬁcients
β̂3 for the market-to-book ratio are −0.0408 (t = −12.07) in column II
and −0.0365 (t = −10.66) in column III. This provides support for H2
and for interpretation of asymmetric cost responsiveness as an indication of the ﬁrm's long-term resource commitments.
3.3.3. Hypothesis H3: Sales volatility
Under hypothesis H3, historical sales volatility would be negatively
associated with asymmetric cost responsiveness, meaning that the
estimated coefﬁcient for the volatility term in our model would be
positive. The estimated coefﬁcient β̂4 is signiﬁcantly positive in all of the
columns of Table 3. Column I reports a coefﬁcient of 0.2571 (t=9.50),
Column II reports a coefﬁcient of 0.2573 (t=10.48) and column III reports
a coefﬁcient of 0.2858 (t=11.40). While our results for H1 and H2
indicate that past growth history and future growth prospects encourage
commitment, our results for H3 indicate that historical sales volatility is
apparently a strong predictor of ﬂexibility in management's resource
procurement planning.
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3.3.4. Hypothesis H4: Industry effects
Under hypothesis H4, we predict that the coefﬁcients on the deviations from industry mean values for average historical sales growth
and for the market-to-book ratio would be negative, and the coefﬁcient on the deviation from industry mean for sales volatility would
be positive.
Table 4 provides the results for our test of H4. The coefﬁcients on
the deviation from industry historical growth (−0.3151 in column I
and − 0.2811 in column III) and the deviation from industry
market-to-book ratio (− 0.0379 in column II and −0.0337 in column
III) are signiﬁcantly negative at the 1% level. The coefﬁcients on the
deviation from industry sales volatility (0.2217 in column I, 0.2156
in column II, and 0.2454 in column III) are signiﬁcantly positive at
the 1% level. Thus, we ﬁnd evidence consistent with ﬁrms developing
ﬁrm-speciﬁc resource procurement plans that lend themselves to
ﬁrm-speciﬁc differences in demand uncertainty.
3.4. Additional analysis investigating asymmetric cost responsiveness
Asymmetric cost responsiveness is conditioned on the information available to the manager about the permanence of a decline in
sales. Because the manager obtains more information about the likelihood of demand recovery with the passage of time, extending the
SG&A costs and sales change period (from 1 year to 2 or more
years) leads to lower observed asymmetric cost responsiveness, i.e.,
the estimated coefﬁcient β̂2 in the basic model is lower (Anderson
et al., 2003). Our hypotheses relate to demand factors that inﬂuence
the selection of a long-term resource procurement plan (ﬂexible versus committed). Therefore, while we anticipate some erosion in the
estimated coefﬁcients on the growth and volatility variables as the
observation window is extended, we expect that the observed relations will be reasonably robust to this extension. We repeated tests
of our ﬁrst three hypotheses by estimating our empirical model
using 2- and 4-year change windows for SG&A costs and sales. Panels
A (2‐year changes) and B (4‐year changes) of Table 5 provide the results of our estimations. Comparing column I (estimation of the
basic model) for panels A and B, we ﬁnd estimates of β̂2 decline
from − 0.1115 for the two-period aggregation model to − 0.064 for
the four-period aggregation model, consistent with previous literature (Anderson et al., 2003). The results presented in the remaining
columns support our ﬁrst three hypotheses. The coefﬁcients on
the average historical growth variable (column II and IV of panels A
and B) diminish somewhat with the length of the observation window but are signiﬁcantly negative in both panels, consistent with
the long‐term nature of many committed resources. The coefﬁcients

Table 3
Precedent and antecedent information and cost responsiveness
"
log

#
"
#
"
#
"
#
"
#
SGAi;t
Salesi;t
Salesi;t
Salesi;t
Salesi;t
¼ β 0 þ β 1 log
þ β 2  Di;t  log
þ β3  Growthi;t−1  Di;t  log
þ β4  Volatilityi;t−1  Di;t  log
þ εi;t :
SGAi;t−1
Salesi;t−1
Salesi;t−1
Salesi;t−1
Salesi;t−1

Column

I
Predicted
sign

Intercept
Log(Salei,t/Salei, t−1)
Di,txLog(Salei,t/Salei, t−1)
Historical growth
MTB
Volatility
R-Squared
N

+
−
−
−
+

II

III

Coefﬁcient
estimate

T-stat

Coefﬁcient
estimate

T-stat

Coefﬁcient
estimate

T-stat

0.0256⁎⁎⁎
0.6453⁎⁎⁎
−0.2046⁎⁎⁎
−0.3736⁎⁎⁎

31.81
110.17
−13.22
−12.18

0.0253⁎⁎⁎
0.6464⁎⁎⁎
−0.1956⁎⁎⁎

31.55
110.48
−12.78

−0.0408⁎⁎⁎
0.2573⁎⁎⁎
0.4276.

−12.07
10.48

0.0257⁎⁎⁎
0.6450⁎⁎⁎
−0.1558⁎⁎⁎
−0.3318⁎⁎⁎
−0.0365⁎⁎⁎
0.2858⁎⁎⁎

32.11
110.23
−9.85
−10.55
−10.66
11.40

0.2571⁎⁎⁎
0.4270
79,177

9.50

0.4305

t‐Statistics are calculated after adjusting the standard errors for heteroskedasticity, serial, and cross-sectional correlation using a two-way cluster at the ﬁrm and year level.
Historical growth: The average of four annual sales growth observations from t − 5 to t − 1; MTB: Market value at the end of year t − 1 divided by book value at end of year t − 1;
Volatility: The standard deviation of sales revenue (divided by total assets) for the years t − 5 to t − 1.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
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Table 4
Precedent and antecedent information, cost responsiveness and industry benchmarks.
Column

I
Predicted
sign

Intercept
Log(Salei,t/Salei, t−1)
Di,txLog(Salei,t/Salei, t−1)
Historical growth Industry
Historical growth deviation
MTB industry
MTB deviation
Volatility industry
Volatility deviation
R-Squared
N

+
−
−
−
−
−
+
+

II

III

Coefﬁcient
estimate

T-stat

Coefﬁcient
estimate

T-stat

Coefﬁcient
estimate

T-stat

0.0261⁎⁎⁎
0.6439⁎⁎⁎
−0.1607⁎⁎⁎
−1.0431⁎⁎⁎
−0.3151⁎⁎⁎

32.46
109.94
−6.20
−10.79
−8.72

0.0255⁎⁎⁎
0.6456⁎⁎⁎
−0.2254⁎⁎⁎

31.91
110.34
−9.04

−0.0630⁎⁎⁎
−0.0379⁎⁎⁎
0.6760⁎⁎⁎
0.2156⁎⁎⁎
0.4284

−8.97
−9.51
8.66
7.65

0.0263⁎⁎⁎
0.6432⁎⁎⁎
−0.0940⁎⁎⁎
−0.8922⁎⁎⁎
−0.2811⁎⁎⁎
−0.0490⁎⁎⁎
−0.0337⁎⁎⁎
0.6249⁎⁎⁎
0.2454⁎⁎⁎

32.94
109.96
−3.42
−9.18
−8.17
−6.69
−8.36
7.92
8.82

0.5679⁎⁎⁎
0.2217⁎⁎⁎
0.4292
79,177

7.19
7.31

0.4327

t‐Statistics are calculated after adjusting the standard errors for heteroskedasticity, serial, and cross-sectional correlation.
Historical growth industry: Average of Historical Growth in a ﬁrm's two-digit SIC code industry (ﬁrms that are in a two-digit SIC code containing fewer than four members are classiﬁed as “Other”); Historical growth deviation: Difference between Historical Growth and Historical Growth Industry; MTB Industry: Average of MTB in a ﬁrm's two-digit SIC code industry; MTB Deviation: Difference between MTB and MTB Industry; Volatility Industry: Average of Volatility in a ﬁrm's two-digit SIC code industry; Volatility Deviation: Difference
between Volatility and Volatility Industry.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.

on the historical volatility variable (columns II, III and IV) are signiﬁcantly negative and strikingly similar across the two panels, consistent with greater use of ﬂexible resources reducing asymmetric
cost responsiveness. The coefﬁcients on the market-to-book ratio
(columns III and IV) are signiﬁcantly negative and hold up well across
the panels, consistent with forward-looking investment in committed
resources.
Our analysis treats growth and volatility as two dimensions of demand uncertainty that separately inﬂuence managers' procurement decisions. Because there may be some interaction between growth and
volatility in setting expectations with regard to demand uncertainty,
we also estimate our models with interaction terms for growth and volatility. We present the results of these estimations in Table 6. Column I
reports results with historical growth interacted with historical volatility. The coefﬁcient on the interaction term is signiﬁcantly positive and
the results on the main variables of interest are robust to this speciﬁcation. Column II reports results with the market-to-book ratio interacted

with historical volatility. The coefﬁcient on the interaction term is not
signiﬁcantly different from zero and the results on the main variables
of interest are also robust to this speciﬁcation. Column III includes
both growth variables and corresponding interaction terms. In this
case, both coefﬁcients on the interaction terms are signiﬁcantly different from zero and the results on the main variables of interest are all robust to this speciﬁcation.
Our tests so far have used cross-sectional panel data to evaluate
how resource decision making across companies is inﬂuenced by information about demand uncertainty. It is also interesting to analyze
decision making on a company-by-company basis. Therefore, we further examine the association between the conditioning variables and
asymmetry in the response of SG&A cost changes to sales declines using
a time-series analysis. We ﬁrst estimate the basic model on a
ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm basis over four 15-year periods (1980–1994, 1985–1999,
1990–2004 and 1995–2009) for ﬁrms with at least 10 observations
and three sales decline observations in a given 15-year period. Panel A

Table 5
Precedent and antecedent information and cost responsiveness with longer change periods.
Column

I
Predicted
sign

Panel A: 2‐year periods
Intercept
Log(Salei,t/Salei, t−1)
Di,txLog (Salei,t/Salei, t−1)
Historical growth
MTB
Volatility
R-Squared
N

+
−
−
−
+

Panel B: 4-year periods
Intercept
Log(Salei,t/Salei, t−1)
Di,txLog (Salei,t/Salei, t−1)
Historical growth
MTB
Volatility
R-Squared
N

+
−
−
−
+

II

III

IV

Coefﬁcient
estimate

T-stat

Coefﬁcient
estimate

T-stat

Coefﬁcient
estimate

T-stat

Coefﬁcient
estimate

T-stat

0.0501⁎⁎⁎
0.6958⁎⁎⁎
−0.1115⁎⁎⁎

28.65
99.24
−6.89

0.0476⁎⁎⁎
0.6957⁎⁎⁎
−0.1184⁎⁎⁎
−0.4695⁎⁎⁎

28.84
102.10
−5.51
−7.93

0.0495⁎⁎⁎
0.6968⁎⁎⁎
−0.0898⁎⁎⁎

28.40
99.35
−3.80

0.2345⁎⁎⁎
0.5299

5.73

−0.0450⁎⁎⁎
0.1931⁎⁎⁎
0.5303

−7.22
4.43

0.0478⁎⁎⁎
0.6956⁎⁎⁎
−0.0696⁎⁎⁎
−0.4005⁎⁎⁎
−0.0358⁎⁎⁎
0.2630⁎⁎⁎

28.95
102.12
−3.17
−7.34
−6.73
6.55

0.0772⁎⁎⁎
0.7517⁎⁎⁎
−0.0734⁎⁎
−0.3179⁎⁎⁎

21.48
85.79
−2.53
−3.50

0.0740⁎⁎⁎
0.7605⁎⁎⁎
−0.0494⁎⁎⁎

18.01
79.66
−1.41

−0.0473⁎⁎⁎
0.1873⁎⁎⁎
0.6290

−4.66
2.70

0.5268
33,004

0.0751⁎⁎⁎
0.7590⁎⁎⁎
−0.0638⁎⁎

0.6275
11,832

18.28
79.56
−2.56

0.2141⁎⁎
0.6285

2.79

0.5318

0.0766⁎⁎⁎
0.7525⁎⁎⁎
−0.0172⁎⁎⁎
−0.2699⁎⁎⁎
−0.0413⁎⁎⁎
0.2398⁎⁎⁎

21.30
85.84
−0.53
−2.88
−4.56
3.41

0.6297

t‐Statistics are calculated after adjusting the standard errors for heteroskedasticity, serial, and cross-sectional correlation using a two-way cluster at the ﬁrm and year level.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
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Table 6
Precedent and antecedent information and cost responsiveness with growth and volatility interactions
log

"
#
"
#
"
#
"
#
"
#
SGAi;t
Salesi;t
Salesi;t
Salesi;t
Salesi;t
¼ β 0 þ β1 log
þ β 2  Di;t  log
þ β3  Growthi;t−1  Di;t  log
þ β4  Volatilityi;t−1  Di;t  log
SGAi;t
Salesi;t
Salesi;t−1
Salesi;t−1
Salesi;t−1
"
#
Salesi;t
þ εi;t :
þβ 5  Growthi;t−1  Volatilityi;t−1  Di;t  log
Salesi;t−1

Column

I
Predicted
sign

Intercept
Log(Salei,t/Salei, t−1)
Di,txLog (Salei,t/Salei, t−1)
Historical growth
MTB
Volatility
Historical Growth × Volatility
MTB × Volatility
R-Squared
N

+
−
−
−
+

II

III

Coefﬁcient
estimate

T-stat

Coefﬁcient
estimate

T-stat

Coefﬁcient
estimate

T-stat

0.0257⁎⁎⁎
0.6462⁎⁎⁎
−0.1759⁎⁎⁎
−0.6194⁎⁎⁎

31.50
110.11
−10.75
−12.02

0.0253⁎⁎⁎
0.6465⁎⁎⁎
−0.2034⁎⁎⁎

31.53
110.48
−11.77

−0.0371⁎⁎⁎
0.2746⁎⁎⁎

−6.72
9.44

−0.0073⁎⁎⁎
0.4276

−0.92

0.0259⁎⁎⁎
0.6446⁎⁎⁎
−0.1337⁎⁎⁎
−0.5856⁎⁎⁎
−0.0282⁎⁎⁎
0.2365⁎⁎⁎
0.5034⁎⁎⁎
−0.0160⁎⁎

32.22
110.12
−7.33
−11.56
−5.21
7.70
5.82
−2.04

0.1721⁎⁎⁎
0.4837⁎⁎⁎

5.89
5.37

0.4280
79,177

0.4316

t‐Statistics are calculated after adjusting the standard errors for heteroskedasticity, serial, and cross-sectional correlation using a two-way cluster at the ﬁrm and year level.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.

of Table 7 presents the aggregate results of our estimations. The results
are consistent with our cross‐sectional estimates evidenced by average
estimates of β̂1 of 0.7285 and β̂2 of −0.2582.
Next, we regress β̂2 for each ﬁrm and 15-year period combination on
our conditioning variables. We also include industry dummies in the regression, although we do not tabulate them. Panel B of Table 7 presents
the results of this estimation. The estimated coefﬁcient on historical
growth is −0.1256 (t = −1.90), on market-to-book is −0.0116
(t = −2.26), and on historical sales volatility is 0.1374 (t = −2.07).

Table 7
Precedent and antecedent information and cost responsiveness: time series analysis.
Panel A: Time series estimation
log

h

SGAi;t
SGAi;t−1

i

¼ β 0 þ β1 log

Mean

h

Salesi;t
Salesi;t−1

i

þ β 2  Di;t  log

Standard
deviation

Median

h

Salesi;t
Salesi;t−1

i

Lower
quartile

0.0131 −0.0176
0.7091
0.4575
−0.1999 −0.6963

Intercept
0.0113 0.0556
0.7285 0.3922
β1
β2
−0.2582 0.8175

Upper
quartile
0.0432
0.9588
0.2441

β2 is estimated in time-series regressions over 15‐year periods (1980–1994,
1985–1999, 1990–2004, and 1995–2009) with at least 10 observations and three
sales declines.
Panel B: Cost responsiveness
^ ¼ a0 þ a1 HistoricalGrowthi;t−1 þ a2 MTBi;t−1 þ a3 Volatilityi;t−1
β
2

Intercept
MTB
Historical growth
Volatility
R-Squared
N

Predicted
sign

Coefﬁcient
estimate

T-stat

−
−
+

−0.1325⁎⁎
−0.0116⁎⁎
−0.1256⁎
0.1374⁎⁎

−2.12
−2.26
−1.90
2.07

0.1131
4522

Estimated β2 is regressed on Historical Growth, MTB and Volatility. Independent variables are measured at the beginning of each time period. Industry dummies are included in the regression but not included in the table.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ pb 0.10.

These results further support our ﬁrst three hypotheses, indicating
that the inﬂuence of the precedent and antecedent variables is persistent over time.

4. Conclusion
Managing and controlling costs in relation to production and sales
is critical to company success. Developing a cost management strategy requires the selection and support of a resource procurement plan.
While such a plan is multifaceted and complex, it manifests itself in
measurable cross-sectional differences in cost behavior. Traditional
cost management approaches described in managerial accounting
textbooks consider how the mix of ﬁxed versus variable costs affects
the degree of operating leverage. Treatments in ﬁnancial analysis
textbooks evaluate costs as a percentage of revenues. These approaches fail to consider how different resource procurement choices
affect cost asymmetry (Anderson et al., 2003, 2007) that reduces
margins when sales decline. We contrast a cost management strategy
focusing on cost agility based on ﬂexible resources to a cost management strategy focusing on cost advantages derived from committed
resources. While a strategy focusing on agility reduces asymmetry
in cost behavior, it leads to higher unit costs for resources and loss
of control over resources. A strategy focusing on committed resources
leads to greater cost asymmetry but may provide competitive advantages due to lower unit costs and greater control over resources.
Observed asymmetric cost responsiveness reﬂects decisions that
companies have made over time with respect to using ﬂexible versus
committed resources. Experience and expectations about demand
uncertainty and about the costs of using ﬂexible or committed resources inﬂuence resource decision making and lead to the formulation, either deliberately or instinctively, of a resource procurement
plan. Our analysis looks at asymmetric cost responsiveness as an outcome of the research procurement plans that companies have developed over time. Thus, we draw on the collective experience of a large
number of companies to provide information about how managers
might combine precedent and antecedent information to formulate
a resource procurement plan as a means of strategic cost management. Our ﬁndings are consistent with managers making procurement decisions that trade off ﬂexibility and commitment based on
their experience and expectations.
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